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  11. Introduction 
Before the 1990s, poverty in China had been considered as a rural issue. On one 
side, this is partly because the urban poor population was too small to be noticed. On 
the other side, poverty in rural areas was experiencing absolute poor in that period. 
After the reform, the rapid development of the Chinese rural economy has improved 
the absolute poor situation in rural areas. In consequence, rural residents’ average 
annual income increased from 134 RMB in 1978, to 397 RMB in 1985, 602 RMB in 
1989, and 3254 RMB in 2004(NBSC, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2006).  The  Engel 
coefficient for rural residents lowered from 0.677 in 1978 to 0.455 in 2005. The rural 
poor population decreased from about 250 million in 1978 to 29 million in 2003, 
accounting for 30.7 percent and 3 percent of the total rural poor population, 
respectively (Xinhua News Agency, Oct 18, 2004).   
While China has made a good progress in cutting the rural poverty population, 
considerable amount of urban residents who have not benefited much from the 
economic reform become the urban poor. Over last 10 years, the registered urban poor 
have grown for more than twenty folds, from 0.85 million in 1996 to 22.32 million in 
2005 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2006). The process of 
urbanization also has drawn millions of labors and families from rural areas to cities, 
which further accelerates the growth of the poor population in Chinese cities.   
Many studies have examined the urban poor problem, with most at the national 
level.  Some have analyzed factors that cause urban poor, such as the economic 
transition, sector changes, labor demand and supply, urbanization, inflation (Tang, 
2002; Mo, 2003; Wei, 2004; Sun and Qi, 2005; Li, 2005; Mei and Qin, 2005; Li and 
Li, 2006).  Some have investigated how the poverty lines are determined (Tang, 
1997; Hussain, 2003; Chen, 2006).    Some have proposed policy recommendations to 
reform the social security system, enforce re-employment schemes, and improve a 
balance between fairness and efficiency (Mei and Qin, 2005). Little research has been 
done from a micro aspect, such as for a city.  Because China has a large range of 
territory and 33 administrative provinces and multiplicities, the problem of urban poor 
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to alleviate the problem more efficiently.   
This paper analyzes the urban poor in China through a case of study of 
Changsha city.  The paper is structured as the follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
literature on the urban poor in China.  Section 3 describes a survey conducted in 
Changsha City, provides qualitative analysis on the urban poor, and examines income 
determinants using the sample data from the survey.  The final section concludes 
main findings and makes policy recommendations. 
 
2. Urban poor in China   
This section attempts to provide a general picture of the urban poor in China by 
answering the following questions.  How many urban poor does China have? How 
poor are the urban poor? Who are the urban poor? What cause the urban poor? 
 
How many urban poor does China have? 
  A number of papers have examined the urban poor population in China, using 
various criteria and from different perspective. Zhu (1998) estimated that the urban 
poor population is about 30 million in1996, based on the NBSC’s survey on urban 
residents and the organization of Chinese Labor Unit’s survey on 60,000 randomly 
selected enterprises in China. Yang (2002) believed that Zhu’s figure was 
underestimated because China had 16 million employees of suspended or bankrupted 
companies, who were not included by the government as urban poor. Hua (2004) 
estimated that there were 32.4 million urban poor by the end of 1997. No consensus 
has been reached about the number of China’s urban poor.  
Also, we believe that the official statistics underestimate the urban poor 
population, mainly due to the fact that most poor rural migrant workers are excluded 
from the official numbers. In 2005, more than 150 million rural residents swarmed 
into the cities all across China (Li, 2005), and the majority of them entered into large 
and developed cities in the eastern coast (Liu et al. 2003; World Bank 2006). Beijing 
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Because of the China’s urban household registration (Hukou) system, these rural 
workers seldom receive the equal treatment as those who were born in the city. For 
example, in 2004, the average income of the urban workers is 16,020 Chinese yuan. 
But the workers from rural areas only got 6400 yuan on average (Liu, 2004). Besides, 
most of rural workers are deprived of all kinds of benefits like health insurance and 
employment-related  insurance.  They  are  suffering from poor living conditions, long 
working hours and tough working environments (Lu and Song, 2006). Yet these poor 
migrant workers are not in the official statistics of the urban poor and are not entitled 
to receive social assistance from the city government. These rural migrants constitute 
an ever-increasing undocumented urban poor population in China.   
  In this paper, we consider the urban poor population as the number of recipients 
who receive the minimum subsistence from the Chinese government.  This number 
will certainly understate the true population because almost all rural poor migrants are 
excluded from the welfare system and many urban poor are not registered.  Since 
this paper does not focus on the exact number of urban poor, using more consistent 
data from official source would better describe the trend.   
The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) of China publishes a statistical bulletin 
every year to report civil affairs, including the number of minimum subsistence 
recipients in Chinese cities.  Over last 10 years, the registered urban poor have 
grown for more than twenty five folds, from 0.85 million in 1996 to 22.4 million in 
2006 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2006). In 2006, this 
population accounted for 4.1 percent of the total urban residents in Chinese cities. 
Table 1 shows the numbers from 2000 to 2006. From 2000 to 2002, China had 
a rapid growth of its urban poor population, partly due to the increased awareness and 
expansion of the coverage of the social assistance program, within which more and 
more people are officially defined as urban poor. Although these are numbers of 
minimum subsistence recipients, it reveals the least urban poor population. We can 
say that by the end of 2006, China had at least 22,409,000 urban poor residents and 
this number does not include the rural migrants who live in the city but are not 
  3registered urban residents.   
 
Table 1: Number of recipients of minimum subsistence   








Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007 
 
How Poor Are the Urban Poor? 
Measurements of poverty are essential in the process of defining urban poor. One 
way to define the urban poor is to look at the poverty lines (Hussain, 2003). Table 2 
presents a broad picture of the poverty lines across cities. It shows that urban poverty 
lines vary with the administrative status and sizes of the city. The poverty line is 
higher for higher administrative status and bigger cities. If we compare the 
employees’ average wage and urban residents’ per capita annual consumption 
expenditure in 2000 to urban poverty lines, it is easier to have an idea of how many 
people are living below the poverty line and what kind of life they have. In 2000, the 
national average wage of staff and workers is RMB 9,371 yuan, which is about 2.5 
times as the highest poverty line; and the national per capita annual consumption 
expenditure is 4,998, which is 1,000 higher than the highest poverty line (NBSC, 
China statistical yearbook, 2001). This comparison has omitted the regional 
differentiation, but a relative big gap between the poor and average level appears. 
Take Beijing for example, in 2005，its average wage of staff and workers is 34,191 
RMB yuan and the per capita consumption expenditure is 13,244.20 RMB yuan. For 
Shanghai, its average wage of staff and workers is 34,345 RMB yuan and the per 
  4capita consumption expenditure is 13,773.41 RMB yuan. In both cities, the poverty 
line is about one fifth of the per capita annual consumption expenditure.    For Hunan 
province with the capital city of Changsha (a city that in our following survey study), 
the regional average wage of staff and workers is 15,659 RMB yuan and the per 
capita consumption expenditure is 7,504.99 RMB yuan (NBSC, China statistical 
yearbook 2006). With the government subsidy out of the social assistance program 
and other limited sources of income, the average income of the urban poor is about 
1,860 yuan per capita per year (Ministry of Civil Affairs of People's Republic of 
China 2006), which is about 17.7% of the average national urban per capita income 
(NBSC，China statistical yearbook 2006). 
 
Table 2: City poverty lines, per year/person, September 2000 
Poverty lines  Places 
RMB 2,400-3,828  Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
4 provincial capital cities and 5 cities with individual 
planning power 
RMB 1,680-2,400  Chongqing, 23 provincial capital cities 
RMB 1,320-1,680  Prefecture level cities 
Below RMB 1,320 
With a minimum of RMB 936 
County level cities 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs of People’s Republic of China, MCAC, 2001. 
 
The other way to evaluate the poverty condition of the urban poor is to check the 
minimum standard of living criterion (Wei, 2004). Minimum standard of living is 
residents’ least expenditure on daily life and has been stipulated by considering many 
different factors. The urban residents’ minimum standard of living criterion is mainly 
based on the following issues: the types and quantities of products that maintaining 
the minimum necessity of living for residents, the expenditure on daily necessity, the 
comprehensive market consumption price index (CPI), residents’ actual average 
income and expense level, the economical development and fiscal conditions of the 
whole nation, and other social security criteria (MCAC, 2007). Stipulated in the same 
way as the poverty lines, the urban minimum standard of living criterion differs across 
cities.  Large cites have higher minimum standard of living criterion than smaller 
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minimum standard of living criterion for Beijing is 310 RMB yuan per month, and it 
is 197.78 RMB yuan per month for Changsha (NBSC, 2007). The key point needs to 
be emphasized is this minimum standard of living is only the least amount of money 
that help one person to survive, which is a very small amount of money that just 
solves the “absolute poverty” problem. 
 
Who are the urban poor? 
Urban poor population can be generally categorized into four groups (MCAC, 
2007; Wei, 2004; Li, 2005). The first group includes people who are unable to work 
(i.e. disabled persons), no income source and no legal raiser (i.e. orphans). They are 
normally called “three does not have” persons in China. Although the current social 
security system can provide some subsidies to them, the amounts of subsidies are 
really limited. These people can only live on the subsidies to survive in their daily life 
and they are the first ones who should be considered as poor people. The second 
group includes the unemployed population. Unemployment is becoming more and 
more common in our daily life with the economical change and grows. If those 
unemployed workers or laid-off employees could not find jobs again, they are losing 
the source of living. Although government provides the minimum standard of living 
subsidies to these people, they still live in poverty. The third group includes retired 
people. In China, retired people depended on the retirement pension which provided 
by companies they previously worked for. If the companies are running well, their 
retirement pension is relatively higher and vice versa. According to current 
employment situation in China, there are many laid-off and unemployed workers 
because of companies’ reduction of staff to pursue economic profit or companies’ 
bankruptcy, those retired people’s retirement pension can not be guaranteed and 
remains at a high level. The fourth group includes people who do not participated in 
any social security program, low income or non income residents who have diseases 
and people whose residential registration belongs to another place other than local 
areas. The last mentioned people in this group have been defined as “floating 
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many people are coming from rural areas and being paid low salaries, and live without 
such protections as urban residents do, this “floating population” becomes a 
significant part in the urban poor. In this group, there are people who are looking for 
jobs. There are a certain number of people who has the ability to work but can never 
find a satisfying job and then stay home without doing anything. Without any steady 
income stream, those people have to be enrolled in the poor population.   
Table 3 presents information about the numbers and ratios of four different 
groups of people in the urban poor.  In 2005, close 40 percent of all urban poor are 
those who were unemployed.    There are 55.70 percent of urban poor people belongs 
to the fourth group as mentioned above.  It is easy to see that floating population in 
the fourth group is an important component of urban poor population. 
 
Table 3: Numbers and ratios for different groups of urban poor people in 2005 
Groups  Three does not have  Unemployed  Retired  Other 
Number (thousand)  957  8332  602  12436 
Ratio
1   4.29%  39.56%  2.70%  55.70% 
Source: Annual statistical report, MCAC, 2005. 
 
It is worth noticing that the composition of the urban poor has changed during 
the last 10 years. In 1995, the elderly, children, and disabled accounted for 82.27 
percent of the total urban poor while the unemployment was not an issue. However, in 
2005, the share of the unemployed and the laid-off workers has risen to 39.56 percent 
(the unemployed and the laid-off workers are not the same in official Chinese 
statistics) (Ministry of Civil Affairs of People’s Republic of China 2006). That means 
the increasing unemployment has become a main source of the urban poor. According 
to the official statistics, the registered unemployment rate was only 2.9 percent in 
1995 and the proportion of the labor force in the labor market was as high as 83 
                                                        
1 According to Ministry of Civil Affairs of China’s annual statistical report, there are 22,328,000 urban residents 
received minimum subsistence, the ratio is calculated by the following equation: ratio=number/ 22,328. 
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proportion of the labor force in the labor market declined to 71.6 percent (Cai 2006). 
The actual unemployment rate could be much higher than that (Song 2003; Xue and 
Wei 2003), because these data exclude the rural migrant workers.   
 
Causes of urban poor 
What cause the increasing urban poor population?    Many previous studied have 
discussed causes of urban poor in China, from various perspectives (Mo, 2003; Li, 
2004; Wei, 2004). The first reason is the economic reform from planned-economy to 
market economy (Song, 2001). The reform started in the late 1970s has leaded 
Chinese economy into the international stage and brought the Chinese GDP in the 
fourth place of the world by 2005 (NBSC, China statistical yearbook 2006). The 
economic growth, however, does not benefit every one. In fact, China sees a vast 
number of laid-off workers from public-owned enterprises.  Before the reform, 
China attempted to maximize urban employment and offered its workers irrevocable 
job contracts (“iron-rice bowl” in Chinese terms). After the reform, this full and 
permanent employment policy stepped out of the stage and many workers are laid off 
to improve labor efficiency in production. The registered unemployed workers 
increased from 5.75 million in 1999 to 8.39 million in 2005, with registered 
unemployment rate of 3.1 and 4.1 percent, respectively (NBSC, China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2006). These laid-off and unemployed employees constitute a great of 
number of the urban poor population.   
The second reason is related to the structural changes of the Chinese economy, in 
terms of sectorial shift and ownership changes.    According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC, China Statistical Yearbook 2006) data, in 1978, there were 
70.5%, 17.4% and 12.1% employees working in the first, second and third industry, 
respectively.  In 2005, these ratios changed to 44.8%, 23.8%, and 31.4%.  In 1978, 
99.8 percent of urban employment belonged to the public sector which includes 
state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises.  This share decreased to 26.7% in 
2005.    These structural shifts imply frictional unemployment in urban China because 
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jobs in one sector but find new jobs in other). Some old industrial bases and resource 
exhausted cities had experienced huge unemployment during the past two decades.  
Take Jilin Province for example, there is 0.47 million workers that have had to 
entangle in the state-owned companies reform and then lost their jobs (Ding, 2006).     
The third important factor that causes the increasing number of urban poor is the 
prominent rural-to-urban migration. Migrant farmers are usually defined as “floating 
population” in China, who live in cities without permanent urban residence 
registration. From 1996 to 2005, the estimated “floating population” increased from 
6.6 million to 11.3 million (NBSC, China Statistical Yearbook 1997-2006); and 
according to unofficial estimation, the “floating population” in 2006 is about 18 
million (Li, 2005). There are two general reasons which contribute to the rural to 
urban migration. One is the difficulty of living in rural areas because of farm land 
scarcity and too much taxes and fees imposed on peasants that push rural residents out 
of their hometowns (Zhang and Song, 2004).    The other is the attractions from cities 
in terms of high income and living quality or other factors that pull rural residents out 
from relative simple life to prosperous life. Equipped with lower education level and 
no permanent residence registration; this “floating population” could only find jobs 
require physical energy with less payment. Therefore, many of them become urban 
poor. 
The fourth cause of urban poor is the incomplete social security system in China. 
Although the social welfare guarantee system has greatly improved in the last two 
decades, the government subsidy still can not fill the gap between the subsidies 
needed population and the subsidy receivers. In 2003, the number of registered urban 
unemployment persons for the total 31 provinces and municipalities is 6.84 million; 
by 2005, this number increased to 7.197 million (NBSC, China Statistical Yearbook 
2006), the growth rate of registered urban unemployment persons for these two years 
is 5.44 percent.. According to the statistical annual report released by Ministry of 
Civil Affairs of People’s Republic of China in 2004, after the minimal living standard 
guarantee system started from 1999, more than 22 million urban residents received 
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system is not advanced enough to protect the urban residents’ life. As stated by Ding 
(2006), China’s economic reform was widely processed under almost no social 
welfare guarantees and this closely connected the unemployment and poverty.   
In addition to the above causes, some other factors also contribute to the 
increasing urban poor population in China, including inflation, limited coverage of 
medical insurance, lack of job training, and inefficiency of the labor market. In fact, to 
mitigate the urban poor problem, China may have to pay more attention to these 
factors than the first three causes discussed above.    Here we would argue that laying 
off redundant workers, structural shifts, and rural-urban migration are inevitable in the 
process of economic reform and development.       
 
Consequences of rising urban poor population 
Government should pay more attention to the negative influences that urban poor 
problem brought about. One of the most explicit problems is that urban poor reduces 
the capability of national economy runs in a steady and healthy way. The expansion of 
urban poor will enlarge the income gap and then trigger a series of social problems 
that affect the stability of society. This situation might be an obstacle in the middle of 
constituting a harmonious well-being society in China. 
Another problem is that urban poor creates labor force waste and loss of 
economy wealth (i.e., GDP). Because the most of the urban poor population is 
composed of “laid-off” or “unemployed” workers who are able to work but do not 
have opportunities to work, this unused labor force is a huge waste for the whole 
nation or even the world’s labor resources. Further more, if the urban poor population 
keeps growing, the government needs to provide more social welfare to assist those 





  103. Urban poor in Changsha 
To make better suggestions to alleviate the urban poor problem，we analyze the 
urban poor in Changsha City through a survey.  This section describes the survey, 




As the capital city of Hunan Province, Changsha has a population of 6.21 million 
(it is the number of people in administrative areas of Changsha, including Changsha 
city residents and also rural residents in the 4 country level cities) and its GDP is 
151.99 billion in 2005, which ranked as 12th among 27 capital cities (excluding 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Hong Kong and Macao from 33 provinces and 
multiplicities) of China (NBSC, Changsha, 2006). According to the Changsha 
Statistical yearbook 2006, there are 35.03%, 29.10% and 35.87% of the labor force 
working in the first, second and third industry, respectively; 2.18 million people live 
in urban areas and have city Hukou; the other part of population is constituted by 
“floating population”, which is 0.477 million (NBSC, Changsha Branch, 2007). 
Although Changsha’ economy has running well in recent years (the GDP growth rate 
in 2005 is 14.9%), it still has 53,600 registered urban unemployment persons, which 
might be included in the urban poor population. Compare with those national data, 
Changsha can serve as a representative city to study urban poor in China.   
To investigate the urban poor in Changsha, we conducted a survey in January 
2007. This survey was conducted through 10 communities in 5 different districts of 
Changsha.
2 2,500 questionnaires were distributed. Because the survey used the 
methods of handing out and receiving questionnaires by group of people and in person, 
the rate of return is 65.6%, which is a satisfied number. 
The questionnaire of the survey contains three parts. The first part is about basic 
                                                        
2 In China, the division of administrative area is as follows: State Council, Province, City, District, and 
Community. 
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The second part is about employment information, such as whether the person has a 
job or not, what kind of job the person has, annual income, whether the person has a 
healthy insurance or not, and whether the person has unemployment insurance or not. 
The last part is about living information, such as how many family members are you 
living with, monthly expenses, housing information and the most urgent problem that 
needs government’s help. Since we already talked to the people who are in charge of 
the communities (those managers knew who are the poor people are) before we 
handed out the questionnaires, it is easier to get the effective responses from poor 
people who are living in the city. In other words, we have targeted the respondents of 
the survey with the help of local district officials, which insures that the respondents 
of the survey are relatively poor residents in the city. Although the community 
managers and us went into people’s home or asked people to go to the communities’ 
offices and even had people who were selling food on the street to fill the 
questionnaires, some of them are not able to answer the questions very well because 
the lack of basic cognitive knowledge.
3 That is why the result contains a total number 
of effective questionnaires of 1,641 out of 2,500 questionnaires.   
Since the average annual income for staff and workers of Changsha in 2006 is 
24,615 RMB yuan (NBSC, Hunan Branch, 2007), we designed the questionnaires to 
be fill by people with annual income range in the following: fewer than 3,000, 3,000 
to 5,000, 5,000 to 10,000, 10,000 to 20,000, 20,000 to 50,000 and over 50,000 RMB 
yuan. The survey results showed that 86.36% of people in the survey have annual 
income less than 20,000 RMB yuan. This indicates that the survey indeed included 
relatively poor people living in Changsha. In addition, as housing is major issue in 
people’s daily life. In 2004, there are 80 percent of people who are living in Changsha 
have their self-owned houses to live (http://www.haofz.com/wz/1.aspx?id=6372, Nov 
26, 2005), but only 46 percent of sample population has their self-owned houses to 
live in 2007. This is another indication to show the sample population is relatively 
                                                        
3 Cognitive knowledge: here means some of them are half illiterates, some of them are not very familiar with the 
governmental policies about working or living, so they can not answer the questions correctly and appropriately.   
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residents in the city because of cognitive knowledge deficiency and other factors, so 
this might result in an overestimation for the annual income level and underestimation 
of poor conditions for urban poor people. 
 
Income Determinants 
Poverty is normally measured with reference to either by income or expenditure 
required by meeting basic needs (Hussain, 2003). Since we got exact information 
about personal income in the survey, this paper uses income to measure the urban 
poor in Changsha. Specifically, we want to investigate factors that affect people’s 
income. 
After conducting an extensive literature on income determination (e.g., Li, 1997, 
Lu and Song, 2006), we choose the following variables in our income analysis. First, 
we consider about gender. In China, gender always plays an important role in 
employment issues. Because of physical energy difference, a male employee is 
preferred to a female employee by employers and tends to get higher payment than a 
female does, especially for some pure physical labor required jobs. In our sample, we 
have 868 males and 773 females. The ratio of men to women is 1.12:1, which indicate 
a relatively balanced employment in gender. 
The second factor is age. Many relatively higher payment job positions always 
require employees to have previous working experience, which are closely related to 
employees’ age. Specifically, the maturity of a person and the ability to deal with 
difficulties are also positively correlated to this person’s age. The average age in our 
sample is 38.83 years old, which might imply this group of people, might have at least 
ordinary salaries as their counter parts in the same level companies. Because the 
sample variance is relatively large for this age variable, we use log of age instead of 
age to reduce the variability of this variable. 
The third factor is Hukou. If we look at recruitment posts, there are many relative 
high payment positions, such as accountants and capital managers, are only accepting 
employees from local areas with city registered Hukou. This is a requirement for 
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surveyed people into two groups: urban population who has city Hukou (registered as 
permanent residents in Changsha) and floating population who does not have Hukou 
in Changsha. There are 1305 people grouped into urban population and 336 people 
grouped into floating population in our survey. 
The fourth factor is the education level. Education level is a main indicator for 
employers to look at when they are hiring employees. Which level of education is 
obtained by the candidate is always considered to measure the person’s ability to 
perform the duty of the position. This is one reason why more and more people are 
pursuing higher education in order to be more competitive in the job market. In our 
survey, 18 people had been educated under primary school level, 95 people with a 
primary school certificate, 407 people with junior high school certificates, 562 people 
with high school certificates, 312 people graduated from professional training school 
(this kind of schooling certificate is in the same level as senior high schooling 
certificate) and 247 people owned a college bachelor degree. In the regression, 
different levels of degrees are coded numerically, say, under primary school =1, 
primary school=2, junior high school=3, senior high school=4, professional training 
school=5 and college =6.   
The fifth factor is working time of the employee. In China, many companies 
have such policy stipulates that employees can get bonus payments if they are 
working for the company more than a certain years, like 5 years or above. This kind 
of policy will encourage employees to work in an active and loyal way. The average 
working duration for those people who participated in our survey is 13.35 years. As 
the as age, we use log of working time duration in order to reduce variability. 
The sixth factor is training before working. Training before working could help 
employees to increase the proficiency in jobs and as a result, more skilled workers 
intend to get more payment. There are 33.8 percent people has training before 
working experiences in the survey.   
The seventh factor is job types of ownership for companies. Some jobs like the 
state-owned companies offered less payment but a secured working contract for 
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will offer higher payments but less secured job positions. According to data generated 
from our survey, there are 56.67 percent of people working in state-owned companies, 
the other portion of people are working in collect-owned, private, foreign, or 
joint-venture companies. 
The last factor we would like to count in is the contract type. The length of 
contract is an indicator of welfare provided by companies. Temporary contact does 
not provide such health insurance or other protection for employees, which will 
decrease the payment for employees in terms of other expenses. About half of the 
population in our survey have employment contract longer than 3 years; others are 
having contracts with less than 3 years length, including employees working without 
contracts. Because the contract length is so different between permanent contract and 
temporary contract, we use log of contract length to reduce variability even though it 
has been coded by numeral levels in the survey.   
The annual income, the dependant variable in our regression model, is the sum of 
12 months income and bonus.  It is an ordinal variable, with 1 for less than 30,000 
yuan, 2 for 3,000~5,000 yuan, 3 for 5,000~10,000 yuan, 4 for 10,000~20,000 yuan, 5 
for 20,000~50,000 yuan, and 6 for over 50,000 yuan. To reduce the variation both in 
dependent and independent variables, we use natural log for annual income, age and 
working time duration.   
Table 4 presents the regression results, for the full sample, urban residents, and 
floating population, respectively.    In the third model, we adjusted the Hukou variable 
by creating the dummy variable for people who has a local rural Hukou =1 and 
otherwise=0. By doing this, we might able to analyze the income difference between 
local rural-urban migrants and rural-urban migrants from outside areas with the 
floating population group.
4 Model 1 shows that age, education level, working time 
duration, training before or after work, types of ownership (collective-owned, foreign, 
joint-venture) and contract length are significantly affect the annual income of urban 
poor people living in Changsha. Specifically, the coefficient for age is negative. This 
                                                        
4 In our sample, Hukou is mostly correlated with contract length, work-time duration, and education.     
  15means younger people are likely to get higher income than older employees. This is 
probably because our survey respondents are mostly involved in physical jobs and 
younger employees are generally better than older employees in physical abilities and 
thus receive higher pay.  The coefficient for Hukou is positive, suggesting that 
floating workers are paid less and employees’ payment is indeed affected by Hukou 
status. The education variable affects income level in a positive way, i.e., education 
helps workers receive higher pay.  The coefficient of working time duration is 
positive and significant, reflecting a working-time wage as a complimentary part of 
income.  Job-training prior employment helps workers get higher pay, implying 
government can assist urban poor by providing job-training to them. The result on the 
contract length variable indicates that employees with longer contract length have 
higher payment.   
 










Constant  1.247 ***(0.148)  1.239 ***(0.173)  1.188 ***(0.278) 
Gender  0.018 (0.016)  0.012 (0.018)  0.031 (0.038) 
Ln Age  -0.110 ***(0.041)  -0.097 **(0.049)  -0.103 (0.081) 
Hukou  0.069 ***(0.025)    -0.046 ** (0.038) 
Education  0.056 ***(0.007)  0.058 ***(0.008)  0.039 *(0.020) 
Ln Duration  0.058 ***(0.012)  0.043 ***(0.014)  0.081 ***(0.021) 
Training  0.063 ***(0.017)  0.060 ***(0.019)  0.047 (0.041) 
Collective-owned  -0.120 ***(0.026)  -0.210 ***(0.027)  -0.119 (0.081) 
Private  0.019 (0.025)  -0.019 (0.031)  0.083 *(0.044) 
Foreign  0.231 ***(0.068)  0.237 ***(0.070)  -0.259 (0.317) 
Joint Venture  0.117 ***(0.043)  0.091 *(0.051)  0.170 **(0.082) 
Ln Contract  -0.030 **(0.015)  -0.032 *(0.017)  -0.021 (0.040) 
R-sq(adj)  14.7% 13.0% 8.7% 
Sample 1641  1305  336 
 
It is interesting to notice that types of enterprise ownership affect the income. 
The coefficient for collect-owned companies is negative and significant. This means 
                                                        
5 Standard values are presented in the parentheses in table 1, asterisks refer to significance levels.   
***          Significant  at  a  1  percent level of significance (99% confidence) 
* *            S i g n i f i c a n t   a t   a   5   p e r c ent level of significance (95% confidence) 
*            Significant  at  a  10  percent  level  of  significance  (90%  confidence) 
No asterisk        Significant at an over 10 percent level of significance (below 90% confidence) 
  16people who are working in collect-owned companies have less income than people 
working in state-owned companies do; people working in a foreign or joint venture 
company have higher payment than people who are working in state-owned 
companies do because of the coefficients for these two variables are positive and 
significant. Theses results imply the characteristics of companies with different types 
of ownerships in China. State-owned or collective-owned companies always provide 
more secured jobs but less income due to the features of these companies: there are 
normally big and old companies belongs to the industrial sector and play a role of 
fundamental infrastructure in the developing process instead of profit seeking. Foreign 
or joint venture companies have sufficient funds and reputation. They are more 
focusing on profit and provide relative higher income for their employees. That is 
why people would like to have higher income will look for jobs in foreign or joint 
venture companies; and those are enjoying the secured working positions will look 
jobs in state-owned or collective-owned companies.   
The regression on the urban worker sub-sample does not show qualitative 
differences from those for the full-sample.  Model 3, however, produces some 
unexpected results.  For example, job-training and age are no longer significant 
factors for migrant’s income.  This could be due to less access to job-training for 
rural migrants and less age variation among migrant workers (28.83 years old on 
average, 10 years younger than the full-sample average).  Nevertheless, model 3 
shows that migrant workers receive higher pay if they are better educated, have 
worked longer, and employees of joint-venture companies. Additionally, in this model, 
we have adjusted the Hukou variable by creating the dummy variable for people who 
has a local rural Hukou =1 and otherwise=0.  The result on the Hukou variable tells 
that rural migrants from outside of Changsha earn more than local rural workers.   
We also used a logit model to determine income factors by dividing workers into 
two groups, with the first group for those who had annual income less than 10,000 
yuan. Table 5 presents the results.    According to the signs of coefficients of variables, 
male and younger workers are more likely to get higher pay than female and older 
workers; workers with city Hukou are paid better than people who do not have city 
  17Hukou; education and working experience help people get more; comparing with SOE 
employees, workers get less pay if they are employees of collective-owned companies 
but higher pay if they work for foreign or joint venture companies; employees with 
longer job contracts are also paid better. A noticeable difference between linear 
regression model and binary logit model is about gender and job training.  The 
variable of gender becomes significant in the logit model while it is not in the linear 
model.    The variable of job training becomes insignificant in the logit mode while it 
was significant in the linear model. But for most other explanatory variables, 
consistent results are obtained.   
   









Constant  -0.585 (0.994)  1.064(1.192)  -3.603 (2.240) 
Gender  0.267** (0.111)  0.161 (0.121)  0.483 (0.299) 
Ln Age  -0.644 **(0.299)  -0.842**(0.342)  -0.028 (0.686) 
Hukou  0.330 **(0.030)    -0.221 (0.038) 
Education  0.423 ***(0.053)  0.413 ***(0.058)  0.449 ***(0.020) 
Ln Duration  0.435 ***(0.087)  0.279 ***(0.101)  0.918 ***(0.205) 
Training  0.181 (0.118)  0.080(0.130)  0.294 (0.312) 
Collective-owned  -1.441 ***(0.201)  -1.489 ***(0.209)  -1.317 *(0.765) 
Private  -0.104 (0.174)  -0.480** (0.207)  0.871 **(0.349) 
Foreign  3.005 ***(1.046)  20.73 (5182.71)  1.174 (1.505) 
Joint Venture  0.585 **(0.294)  0.331 (0.346)  1.199 **(0.592) 
Ln Contract  -0.304 *** (0.105)  -0.341*** (0.115)  -0.3465 (0.293) 
Log-likelihood  -952.990 -774.632 -156.735 
Sample 1641  1305  336 
 
Other Indicators of Living Standard 
In the survey we have also collected information about the health insurance, 
retirement pension, unemployment insurance, living expenses and housing of urban 
poor residents. Understanding how those poor urban residents are living will help 
them to live a better life and also assist the government to accomplish the goal of 
constituting a harmonious and well-being society.     
Table 6 summarizes respondents’ answers to a hypothetical question in the 
  18survey, what will you live on if unemployed? As a whole group, we can see that most 
of the people will live on two sources if they do not have a job, 24.92% on 
unemployment insurance and 22% on family fund, respectively. Others will also 
depend on the subsidy from government’s minimum subsistence, laid-off subsidies 
and their personal savings. The sources of living without a job, however, are very 
differences between city people and the floating population, especially the subsidy 
related sources such as minimum subsistence, laid-off subsidies and unemployment 
insurance. In China, the urban population benefits from three lines of defense against 
poverty, namely, the minimum subsistence, laid-off subsidies and unemployment 
insurance (Hussain, 2003). 28.2% urban residents depend on unemployment insurance 
to live if they do not have jobs, but only 12.2% floating population depend on this 
source to live. Floating population is mainly depending on family support (38.1%) 
and personal savings (23.21%) to live. If we group the minimum subsistence, laid-off 
subsidies and unemployment insurance into “three lines” and group family support, 
personal savings and borrow money from relatives into “private savings,” 59.31% 
urban population will live on three lines if they are unemployed, but only 26.74% 
floating population depends on three lines to live; 38.39% of urban population 
depends on private savings and while 69.64% of floating population depends on 
private savings.  The different responses on sources of living without jobs between 
urban and floating population appear evident.   
 
Table 6: Sources for living without jobs 
Sources for life without jobs  Total  Urban  Floating 
Minimum  subsistence  13.41% 15.02% 7.1% 
Laid-off  subsidies  14.32% 16.09% 7.44% 
Unemployment  insurance  24.92% 28.20% 12.20% 
Family  support  22.00% 17.85% 38.10% 
Personal  savings  18.34% 17.09% 23.21% 
Land money from relatives  4.45%  3.45%  8.33% 
Bank  loans  1.34% 1.07% 2.38% 
  19No  responses  1.22% 1.23% 1.19% 
 
Table 7 compares health insurance, retirement pension, and unemployment 
insurance for our respondents with and without city Hukou. For people with city 
Hukou, 73.26%, 67.66%, and 57.85% have health insurance, retirement pension, and 
unemployment insurance, respectively.  For floating population, these numbers 
become 31.25%, 25.89%, and 26.49%. Apparently, Hukou is a key factor that prevents 
rural migrants from obtaining adequate social protection.    This puts migrant workers 
into a more vulnerable situation when they lose jobs. To better protect the floating 
population, fewer restrictions should be enforced on social security system.    In other 
words, benefits should not depend on Hukou. 
 
Table 7: Social insurances received by respondents 
Insurances Total  Urban  Floating 
Health insurance  64.66%  73.26%  31.25% 
Retirement pension  59.11%  67.66%  25.89% 
Unemployment insurance  51.43%  57.85%  26.49% 
 
Table 8: Sample population’s working companies categorized by types of ownerships 
 Total  Urban  Floating 
State-owned 58.74%  58.93%  49.11% 
Collective-owned 11.27%  12.72%  5.65% 
Private 13.65%  10.65%  25.30% 
Foreign 1.46%  1.69%  0.60% 
Joint venture  3.60%  3.22%  5.06% 
Other 10.73%  9.96%  13.69% 
No responses  2.38%  2.84%  0.60% 
 
Table 8 tells where our survey respondents work, in terms of enterprise 
ownerships. Compare with the urban workers, there are a larger percentage of floating 
  20population working in private and joint venture companies, but smaller percentage of 
floating population working in state-owned, collective-owned foreign companies. In 
urban China, state-owned or collective-owned companies usually provide more job 
security but less income to employees than private, foreign or joint venture companies. 
Since we are investigating urban poor, which means the surveyed people already are 
low income persons, the bigger percentage of floating population working in the 
private and joint venture companies will worse their livings due to less secured jobs. 
The ability to access decent and affordable housing is a basic measurement of 
well-being for people living in a city. There are four major sources of housing options 
for people in China: buying their own houses or apartments, renting a place to live, 
and living in the welfare houses or apartments provided by employers or government, 
and other situations such as living with relatives or friends. Examining the housing 
conditions for urban poor population will help us to find ways of making urban poor 
residents live more comfortable and improve their poverty conditions. Table 9 shows 
that about 50% of urban workers live in their own apartments, but this number 
decreases to 32% for the floating population. As we mentioned before, there are 80% 
of people living in Changsha have their self-owned houses, the 50% and 32% of urban 
and floating population have self-owned houses is much more lower than the city 
level. There are 22% and 11% of urban and floating population living in welfare 
houses, respectively. A noticeable difference between the percentages of urban and 
floating population in renting is worthy to consider. There are 36.61% of floating 
population renting a home and only 15.56% of urban population doing this. There is 
also a relative big portion (19.64%) of floating population living in other sources of 
housing, such as work sheds in construction sites. It is safe to conclude that floating 
population is living in a more inferior housing condition than their city counterpart. 
Further more, the chances for the urban and floating population to buy their own 
houses are slim. In 2006, the average price of housing in Changsha city is about 3,000 
per square meters (http://www.hnup.com/article/article1.asp?id=12354&classid=249). 
For those relatively poor residents, we suppose they want to buy smaller houses such 
as 70 square meters, which will cost about 210,000 RMB yuan. But the annual income 
  21for over 86% of this group of people is under 20,000 RMB yuan. It is so difficult for 
these poor people to have their own houses, especially for the floating population.   
 
Table 9: Housing information 
Housing Total  Urban  Floating 
Self-owned 46.07%  49.66%  32.14% 
Rent 19.87%  15.56%  36.61% 
Welfare 20.41%  22.84%  11.01% 
Other 13.47%  11.88%  19.64%% 
 
In the survey, we asked the question: “what is your first choice if the government 
can solve the following problems for you?” Table 10 presents the summary.    It shows 
that most urban poor people want the government to help them in housing and job, the 
two basic human rights.  For the urban poor with city Hukou, about 38% consider 
housing as their first problem that they want the government to help. We collected 
some questionnaires in person and went to these poor people’s home; quite a number 
of poor people are living a room like a studio about 30 square meters with 3 or 2 
family members.  About 28% consider children education and 22 % consider job as 
their first problem to ask for government help.  For the urban poor without city 
Hukou, job (35.4%) is the first thing that they want the government to help.    Housing 
(34.8%) is of equal importance.  About one quarter (14.6% plus 11.9%) of rural 
migrants want the government to first help their own and children education.  It is 
interesting to notice than only 3.27% of floating population wants to solve the 
problem of Hukou first. We believe it is partly because respondents for this question 
can only choose one problem to be solved and partly because job and housing are 
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Table 10: First problem that the urban poor want the government to help 
Problems  Total   Urban   Floating 
Housing 36.99%  37.55%  34.82% 
Children 24.92%  28.28%  11.90% 
Education 11.88%  11.19%  14.58% 
Job 24.80%  22.07%  35.42% 
Hukou 0.91%  0.31%  3.27% 
Other 0.24%  0.31%  0% 
No responses  0.24%  0.31%  0% 
         
Some of our survey questions are for rural migrants only.  For example, we 
asked how long they plan to stay in the city and we found that 59.3% want to stay 
permanently or as long as possible, 25.6% don’t know their plan, and only 14% plan 
to stay in the city temporarily.    This finding suggests that most rural migrants want to 
live in the city for a long time, even if it is not permanent. 
Table 11 shows reasons why farmers migrate into city. In our survey, we asked 
participants to check all important reasons that caused them to migrate. Hence, the 
sum of all percentages is not 100%.  There are 47.7% and 50% of rural Hukou 
residents chose higher income and more opportunities in cities as their reasons to 
migrate. Higher living quality, children’s education and personal education also count 
relative high ratios for 37%, 36% and 23%, respectively. No doubt, it is the cities’ 
halos that pull rural residents out of their hometowns. From Table 12, we do not find 
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Table 11: Major reason for rural residents to migrate from rural to urban areas 
Reasons Percentage 
Higher income in cities  47.67% 
More opportunities  50% 
Higher living quality  37.21% 
Following others  11.63% 
For children’s education  36.05% 
For personal education  23.26% 
Lack of land  9.3% 
Too many taxes and fees in rural areas  10.47% 
 
Many rural migrants have families or relatives living in their hometowns and 
depending on the money they send back home to maintain life. This “double 
residence” characteristic of rural Hukou residents makes their poor life even more 
complicated. How much money these migrants send back home directly affect the 
lives of their relatives and themselves. If they are not doing well in cities and living in 
the situation of poverty, this will lead to problems of both urban and rural poverty in 
China. According to the data in our survey, the average amount of money these rural 
residents sent home every month is about 518 yuan, which is 63.8% of their income. 
How can migrant workers send most of their income back to their rural families?  
We think it is because many migrant workers are working at construction sites or 
restaurants and other companies which provide food and place to live for employees 
(according to the data, 40% of people in this group are working at such companies). 
These companies provide their migrant workers with shabby shelters (i.e. one 30 
square meters shelter for 15 persons to live) or small rooms (i.e. or one 20 square 
meters room for 6 persons to live) because they want employees’ working time to be 
  24flexible and pay lower wages. Our survey further indicates that male rural workers are 
more likely to send money back home than female workers. The amount of money 
sent to rural homes is positively correlated to migrant’s annual income, martial status, 
whether have children; it is negatively correlated to the time that migrant workers 
have lived in cities and or left hometown. Clearly, connection with rural homes is an 
important factor for migrant workers to send money back.   
 
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations   
This paper has examined the overall picture of the urban poor in China.  We 
found that the urban poor population has steadily increased since the beginning of this 
century, with the number of minimum subsistence recipients rising from 4 million in 
2000 to 22.4 million in 2006.    The composition of the urban poor has changed from 
mainly the elderly, children, and disabled to the laid-offs and new migrated rural 
workers.  We argued that the increasing urban poor population is largely caused by 
the general economic reform which promotes production efficiency and introduces 
competition, the structural changes of the economy which leads to frictional 
unemployment especially in old industrial bases, a massive rural-urban migration 
which bring millions of rural workers into Chinese cities, and the inadequate social 
security system which excludes all most all rural migrants. It is inevitable to lay off 
redundant workers, experience structural shifts, and have massive rural-urban 
migration in the process of economic reform and development.  It also will take 
China a long time to improve its social security system.  Therefore, urban poor is a 
persistent problem and deserves more attention. 
Based on a recent survey conducted in January 2007, which includes 1305 city 
workers and 336 migrant workers, the paper has investigated income determinants 
and other aspects of living standard for relatively poor residents in Changsha.  Our 
empirical results show that annual income is statistically affected by worker’s age, 
Hukou status, education, working time duration, job training, enterprise ownerships, 
and contract length. Facing unemployment, city workers would live mostly on social 
  25security including unemployment insurance (28%), minimum subsistence (15%), 
laid-off subsidies (16%), while migrant workers had to rely on private support 
including family support (38%) and personal savings (23%). Migrant workers, who 
are already making significant lower income and facing more uncertainties, have to 
send significant portion of wages back to their rural homes.  Our rural worker 
sub-sample shows that migrant workers send about 64% of earnings to their rural 
homes. 
We would suggest the following policy recommendations.  The first is to 
eliminate the Hukou system. As a long existed administrative instrument, Hukou has 
helped China to develop its urban economy, promote exports, and build public 
infrastructure.  However, it becomes a fatal distress for floating population when 
they are looking for jobs in cities. Our survey shows that finding jobs is the first thing 
that rural migrants want the government to help them. Removing the Hukou system 
may make the competition between urban and rural workers more fierce in the short 
run.    It also could improve the efficiency and fairness of the labor market. 
Second, education and job-training help the urban poor.  Our survey show that 
39% of city workers and 26% of migrant workers consider education is the first thing 
they want the government to help them.  Our regression analysis proves that 
job-training significantly improve worker’s income.  Facing a large number of 
laid-off workers and massive rural-urban migration, we would suggest that the 
Chinese government make great efforts to re-train laid-off workers and give equal 
education opportunities to children of migrant families.     
The third is to improve social insurance for poor people, including health 
insurance, old-age insurance, and unemployment insurance. Our sample data indicate 
that many workers do not have social security, especially migrant workers. In our 
sample, 27%, 32% and 42% of urban workers do not have health insurance, 
retirement pension and unemployment insurance, respectively.  For floating 
population, these numbers increase to 69%, 74% and 74%, respectively.  More than 
two-thirds of all migrant workers don’t have any social protection.  Thus, it is 
important for China to expand its social security coverage.   
  26The fourth is to improve housing condition for the urban poor.  In our sample, 
less than half of urban workers and less than one-third of migrant workers own homes. 
For urban workers, housing is the first thing that they need government help.  For 
migrant workers, housing is the second most important thing, right after jobs, that 
they need government help.  No question, improving housing condition will help to 
mitigate the urban poor problem. Currently, China has various policies to help 
lower-income families to buy homes, such as the “comfort housing” and “economy 
housing” projects.    However, China faces many challenges to implement its policies.   
Still, the urban poor would not be able to purchase homes from “comfort housing” 
and “economy housing” projects.    To help the urban poor, public housing or housing 
allowances may become necessary. 
The urban poor problem, like many other urban problems such as transportation, 
needs efforts from both the government and the general public.    No one policy could 
fully remedy the urban poor problem.  Indeed, most individual policies cannot even 
make a dent in such problem.  That means various remedies must be combined to 
effect a cure.  Those who are striving to do so are like the woodsman who must cut 
down a huge tree with only one small axe.  He cannot fell the tree or even make 
much of a cut in it with one swing of the axe.  But he can eventually cut it down, 
with one hundred or more small cuts.  A multifaceted approach offers the only hope 
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